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Abstract. In this essay, we aim to help clarify the nature of so-called 'occurrences' 
by attributing distinct modes of existence and persistence to processes and events. 
In doing so, we break with the perdurantism claimed by DOLCE’s authors and we 
distance ourselves from mereological analyzes like those recently conducted by 
Guarino to distinguish between 'processes' and 'episodes'. In line with the works of 
Stout and Galton, we first bring closer (physical) processes and objects in their way 
of enduring by proposing for processes a notion of dynamic presence (contrasting 
with a static presence for objects). Then, on the events side, we attribute to them the 
status of abstract entities by identifying them with objects of thought (by individual 
and collective subjects), and this allows us to distinguish for themselves between 
existence and occurrence. We therefore identify them with psychological (or even 
social) endurants, which may contingently occur. 
Keywords. Processes, Events, Objects, Facts, Endurance, Occurrence, Intentional 
ontology 
1. Introduction 
'Occurrences', those entities that are said to ‘happen’, have been the subject of renewed 
analyzes in Formal Ontology for a few years. Named also 'perdurants' or 'eventualities', 
they correspond to entities as diverse as processes, events, states and changes of states. 
According to Antony Galton [13], these efforts are beneficial because, even today, we 
find in literature as many classifications as there are authors and the problem is not so 
much the choice of criteria as our imperfect understanding of their nature. 
Significant work has being done independently by Rowland Stout [36][37] and 
Galton [12][13], in the late 1990s and early 00s, to clarify the nature of processes. They 
have indeed proposed a new conception of processes bringing them closer to objects in 
their way of enduring in time by being 'wholly' present at every moment of their lives. 
Their proposal is the subject of debate. An important issue (in the eyes of debaters) is 
whether the processes are, or not, entities extended over time. If so, according to Helen 
Steward [34][35], processes would remain 'occurrences', sharing some features of 
continuants such as being able to change properties over time. Otherwise, according to 
Stout [38], processes would be, so to speak, 'dynamic' continuants. 
Nicola Guarino is also one of the researchers working to clarify the nature of the 
occurrents. As co-author of DOLCE, he proposed a perdurantist analysis of the 
occurrences [27]. Recently, starting from work with Giancardo Guizzardi and João Paulo 
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 Almeida concerning the conceptual modeling of business processes [20], he proposed to 
refine the mereological theory of the perdurants of DOLCE in order to better characterize 
two categories of occurrences, 'processes' and 'episodes' [19]. 
For our part, we have recently seized on the subject by developing an ontological 
framework strongly inspired by the proposals of Stout and Galton [23]. The originality 
of our proposal lies in our conception of events: where, traditionally since Donald 
Davidson [8], the event is conceived as a concrete particular (and Guarino espouses this 
conception), we attribute on the contrary to events the status of abstract entity by 
assimilating them to mental entities, even social entities. Historically, this point of view 
was defended in the 1970s by philosophers like Roderick Chisholm [5] and Neil Wilson 
[42]. Closer to home, Kathleen Gill argued that the only way to distinguish processes 
and events in our ontological inventory was to consider abstract events [18]. 
Fundamentally, in our view, the merit of such a conception is to distinguish between two 
too often confused notions that are the existence and the occurrence (in the sense of 
realization) of events. 
In this chapter, we elaborate on our ontological framework, whose basic 
commitments and main primitives are recalled respectively in Sections 2 and 3. Our 
intention is to show that it is possible - and even healthy - to approach the clarification 
of the nature of the occurrences, disregarding the merological dimension. We focus on 
processes and events. Concerning the former, we propose to give an account of their 
endurance by means of a notion of 'dynamic' physical presence (to be compared with the 
'static' presence of physical objects). Concerning the second, we propose to distinguish 
between the notions of logical existence and of occurrence to describe them as 
psychological (even social) endurants, which can contingently occur. To formulate these 
propositions, we position ourselves with DOLCE and recent Guarino’s analyzes. 
2. Our basic commitments 
As a starting point, we follow Strawson's (1959) project of establishing a descriptive 
metaphysics to account for "the actual structure of our thought about the world". The 
aim is thus to establish categories and notions that reflect the way in which we conceive 
the world1. Adopting a contemporary perspective of ontology, we retain as the main 
mode of structuring the world three types of reality: physical, mental and social. This 
division of reality is based on the recognition of distinct modes of existence. It leads us, 
in our engagements, to track the border between facts and interpretations, as we invite 
Maurizio Ferraris [9]: “Therefore, the point is not to claim that there is a discontinuity 
between facts and interpretations but rather to understand what objects are constructed 
and what ones are not. [...] This work consists in distinguishing carefully between the 
existence of things that exist only for us, that is, things that only exist if there is a 
humanity, and things that would exist even if humanity had never been there.” 
This meticulous work of investigation, we engage in the field of the occurrents. An 
important first step for us is Galton's proposal to substitute the classic distinction 
'continuing' vs. 'occurrent' for the distinction EXP vs. HIST (Fig. 1) between the world 
as it unfolds and its history [13]: “[…] processes differ markedly from events in their 
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 relation to change. Whereas events are fixed items of history which cannot be described 
as undergoing change, processes are more like ordinary objects in that they can be 
directly present at one time and can undergo change as time proceeds. This leads to a 
fundamental ontological distinction between EXP, the dynamic experiential world of 
objects and processes as they exist at one time, and HIST, the static historical overview 
populated by events that are generated by the ongoing process in EXP.” 
 
Figure 1. The distinction between experimental and historical entities (from (Galton, 2008)) 
According to Galton, this distinction corresponds to two perspectives of description 
of the world. On the contrary, we propose to see an opposition between the physical 
world and the mental and social worlds and, more precisely, to position events conceived 
as historical entities in the mental and social worlds [23]. The argument can be 
summarized as follows: the history of the world consists of how the world evolves over 
time; to appreciate changes, or on the contrary stabilities, requires the memory of 
observers; events are therefore psychological and social constructs. 
3. Our ontological framework (in a nutshell) 
In this section we give an overview of our main ontological primitives2. To put them in 
scene, we follow the following thread: 
 The physical world is peopled with substances - objects and processes - which, 
by enduring, ensure its stability as well as its dynamicity (§3.1); 
 These substances, temporarily bearing properties and maintaining relations with 
other substances, have a life, which consists of facts existing in the physical 
world (§3.2); 
 Cognitive subjects, immersed in the physical world, represent through events 
the past, present and future history of the world in order to interact with it (§3.3). 
3.1. The substances 
To begin our inventory, we adopt a classic conception of the physical object. A physical 
physical object is something: 
(o_i) existing at instants; 
(o_ii) having properties at instants (e.g.: color, odor, mass, volume); 
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 (o_iii) that may change over time. 
 
These properties express the conception of a 3D entity existing at instants and 
enduring over time with properties that can vary over time. The properties (o_ii) and 
(o_iii) characterize the life of the physical object: we return to it in §3.2. In extension, 
examples are maximally connected objects, whether they are inert (e.g., a stone, an apple 
detached from a tree, a molecule of water, a planet), animated-alive (e.g., a human being, 
a flower, a tree) or artifacts (e.g., a chair, a clipboard, a television). In the case of artifacts, 
we will see in §3.2 that we consider them as physical objects simpliciter endowed with 
a social life. 
The characterization we now give of physical processes is largely based on the idea 
of dynamics continuants developed mainly by Stout [36][37], Galton [12][13] and Galton 
and Riichiro Mizoguchi [16]. A physical process is something: 
(p_i) existing at instants; 
(p_ii) having properties at instants (e.g.: direction, speed of execution, sound level, 
spatial amplitude); 
(p_iii) that may change over time; 
(p_iv) enacted by a physical object. 
 
We find with (p_i) (p_ii) and (p_iii) the same characterization as for the physical 
object, in other words that of a substance - a substrate bearing properties. In extension, 
examples of physical processes are: the movement of a physical object (leading to the 
displacement or rotation of the object on itself); the growth in size of a physical body; 
the life process of a person; the ripening of a fruit; oxidation of a ferrous metal object; 
the melting of a glacier. 
Property (p_i) is a strong commitment to the nature of processes. It is found 
expressed in Stout [36]: “The phrase, ‘What is happening now’, is naturally taken to 
denote a whole process ; and we do want to claim that what is happening now is literally 
identical with what is happening at some other time – the very same process.” 
This commitment hinges on the following complementary commitment: the cause 
is part of the process, which process is the ‘engine’ of change. In the case of a change of 
location of an object, this change results from a movement of the object - the process. 
Associating the cause with the process, according to Stout, is necessary to twist the neck 
of the Russellian conception of a movement as a series of successive states [37]: “[The] 
motion should not be understood in Russell’s way as the arrow being in one state and 
then in another and in the meantime being in all the intervening states. The arrow’s 
motion is what gets it through this continuous series of states - it effects the transition.” 
The properties (p_ii) and (p_iii) follow logically and continue bringing processes 
closer to objects, as Galton puts it [12]: 3 “Like objects, processes can change: the 
walking can get faster, or change direction, or become limping. All around us processes 
undergo changes: the rattling in the car becomes louder, or change rhythm, or may stop, 
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 only to start again later. The flow of the river becomes turbulent; the wind veers to the 
north-west.” 
To finalize (momentarily) the characterization of our physical processes, let us 
evoke a last ontological commitment - the property (p_iv) - namely the fact that a process 
is not a continuant floating in the air, but is 'anchored' in a support object: this is the 
movement of an arrow, the ripening of a fruit, the melting of a glacier, etc. To account 
for this strong constitutive link, we take over the enaction relationship introduced by 
Galton and Mizoguchi [16]. For these authors, to say that an object ‘enacts’ a process 
amounts to saying that an object carries an "external" or "behavior" process [16]: “The 
key notion is that an object, considered from a particular point of view, is characterized 
in terms of the processes it enacts. These are what we call the external processes or 
behavior of the object. This behavior arises as a result of various internal processes 
which causally contribute to it.”   
This enaction relation establishes an existential dependence of the process on an 
object. For the object, as we will clarify, enacting processes is part of his contingent life. 
3.2. The life of substances 
Our ontological inventory is at this stage composed of substances - objects and physical 
processes. Being entities that persist in time while maintaining their identity, they exist 
at different times and this leads us to talk about their ‘life’. Intuitively, this term denotes 
what happens contingently to a substance between the moment when it acquires an 
existence and the moment when it ceases to exist. The properties (o_ii) and (p_ii) 
characterize the basic brick of life respectively objects and processes. Note that they 
assume the existence of properties. To dedicate their place in our inventory, we will 
provide some details on their nature. Moreover, the brick itself expresses a temporal fact. 
Following a conception now well established in metaphysics, we also add this primitive 
to our inventory. Finally, what we call ‘life’ of a substance is an accumulation of facts 
throughout the existence of the substance. 
Let's start with the properties, and with a terminological clarification: the term 
“property” is commonly used to denote, on the one hand, the universals (types) and 
tropes (instances) which characterize substances [1] and, on the other hand, concepts or 
categories that structure our representations and theories of the world [26]. These entities 
have different modes of existence and attribution. As we will show later, the coherence 
of our ontological framework requires us to consider both. In particular, for the notion 
of life that interests us in this paragraph, we will see that it is relevant to distinguish 
between ‘physical’ life and ‘social’ life of substances. To distinguish them, we will refer 
to them by using respectively the terms "physical property" and "conceptual property". 
We identify therefore, on the one hand, physical properties whose existence is 
independent of human thoughts (a large treatment of these properties can be found in 
[1]). Following Peter Hacker [21], we consider that objects and processes bear different 
properties. The way of being of a physical object, for example of a person, corresponds 
to properties/relations like: 'Being anxious', 'Being next to Mary', ‘Walking’.4 For a 
process, examples of properties are: 'Being fast', 'Being noisy', ‘Slowing down’. On the 
other hand, we also identify conceptual properties whose existence depends only on 
human thoughts [31]. Typically these properties correspond to functions we assign to 
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 physical objects (e.g., 'Being a table', 'Being a paperweight') or processes (e.g., 'Being an 
endorsement', 'Being a threat'). 5  We will now see that this distinction of modes of 
existence among properties is reflected in distinct modes of existence among the facts. 
The category of property being introduced, we continue to expand our inventory 
admitting this time that of fact. The thesis of the existence of such entities, advanced by 
many philosophers (e.g., Kit Fine [10], Donald Armstrong [1]), is a companion thesis of 
the real theory (to understand by this, of the ‘physical existence’) of properties: the 
simultaneous existence at a given instant of the substance 'Paul' and the property 'Being 
anxious' does not mean that the substance 'Paul' exemplifies at this instant the property 
'Being anxious', and the same holds true for the substance 'Paul' and the relation 'Being 
next to Mary'. The fact, or the ‘circumstance’ (to use Fine's term), corresponds to this 
internal link uniting, at a given instant, the substance and the property/relation into a 
separate entity. The main argument for facts’ existence is that they constitute a truth-
maker, that is, what makes true in the world such propositions as 'Paul is anxious' or 'Paul 
is beside Mary' [1]. It will be noted that we have admitted time as constituent of our facts, 
thus considering tensed facts. This is consistent with the properties (o/p_ii) expressing 
that objects and processes bear properties at instants. Simply, this choice has an impact 
on the mode of existence of facts. Indeed, since facts exist only at times at which their 
constituents exist, they exist only at the instant corresponding to their temporal 
constituent. These are states of affairs 'that obtain' at this instant: they do not endure in 
time. 
According to our distinction between physical and conceptual properties, as we 
suggested, we distinguish between ‘physical’ facts (or ‘brute’ facts, to use Searle's 
terminology) and ‘social’ facts. The formers have an existence independent of all human 
thought towards them: the fact that 'Paul is next to Mary now' has a physical reality 
independent of what Mary can think. The seconds, on the other hand, are human 
constructs. The association of a property with a substance corresponds to a human 
stipulation that can be based on a social convention. To use Searle's analysis and its 
expression “count as” to denote the result of this stipulation [31]: this piece of paper 
counts as 'Being a 10 euro banknote' (for an agent or a community of agents, under 
certain circumstances); such pebble counts as 'being a paperweight'. Different analyzes 
of social facts have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [40]). Searle's is given here as 
an example. The essential thing for us is to emphasize that the life of substances is not 
limited to their physical life but that it also involves for subjects a social life. 
Before closing this paragraph on the facts, and in view of the forthcoming discussion 
on the notions of occurrence and event, let us consider two categories of brute facts 
related to the dynamics of the world. We have already mentioned a first category with 
the property (p_iv) expressing the fact that every process is enacted at every instant by 
an object. These facts of process enaction are part of the ‘processual life’ of objects. A 
second category of facts concerns this time the very life of processes. It is about the fact 
that processes can perpetuate each other, in a phenomenon of propagation of causality 
(we take up here a relation identified by Galton in his inventory of causal-like relations 
between processes and events [14]). For example, a moving air mass can 'perpetuate' the 
movement of a leaf, or the movement of a person's arm can 'perpetuate' the movement of 
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 his/her wristwatch. These facts of enaction and perpetuation of processes, by 
participating in the dynamics of the world, can be said to 'occur'. Note that they are not 
usually included in inventories of occurrences, being neither processes, nor events, nor 
states, nor changes of states. Their role in explaining the dynamics of the world is in any 
case an additional argument in favor of their existence (completing the ‘truthmaker’ 
argument). 
3.3. The life history of substances 
By evoking the social facts, we began to clear the world of mental and social constructs. 
In this section, we continue in this direction by focusing on a specific category of 
constructs: life histories of substances - objects and processes - populating the physical 
world. The main ontological category that we will add to our inventory is that of event. 
Historically, in the 1970s, authors such as Chisholm [5] and Wilson [42] proposed to 
conceive of events as abstract entities. Yet the metaphysics of the states of affairs were 
at that time in its infancy, and this explains the limits of their propositions. We are taking 
advantage today of advances, notably in the field of ontology of facts, to propose a more 
solid theory. 
We consider that an event is something: 
(e_i) existing for a subject at instants; 
(e_ii) that may occur ; 
(e_iii) having properties at times; 
(e_iii) that may change over time. 
Before discussing these properties, take care to characterize in extension the class of 
events. The diversity of events is due to both the number of substances involved and the 
length of their lives taken into account. 
Basically, to conceive of the history of the life of substances amounts to considering 
a slice of their life bounded in time. This mechanism has been described by Galton and 
Mizoguchi, with the aim of distinguishing between processes and events (2009, 75): “We 
maintain, on the contrary, that so far from being a mark of short duration, boundedness 
is a precondition for the assignment of any definite duration: processes endure, but only 
once we have assigned bounds to them can we speak of duration, and the act of assigning 
bounds means that we have switched our attention from the process to an event.” For a 
running process, a slice of life can be: 'the first 10 seconds of Paul's race'. For a person, 
we can evoke 'Paul's childhood' (the slices of life of people we usually refer to are many, 
e.g., adolescence, youth, retirement, old age). 
By staying focused on the history of a particular substance, another category of 
events concerns the evolution of substances in one aspect. States express a stability in 
time, for example: 'Paul's fatigue of this morning' (for an object); 'The slow pace of Paul's 
walk during the first 5 minutes' (for a process). The changes, on the contrary, reflect a 
modification of an aspect of a substance, for example: 'Paul's journey to the station this 
morning' (for an object); 'The blazing acceleration of Paul's run in the last 100 meters' 
(for a process). 
Finally, still in extension, some events concern the life of a large number of objects 
and processes, such as: 'The assassination of Caesar on March 15, 44 BC. J.-C. ',' the 
sinking of the Titanic in the night of 14 to 15 April 1912 '. Some events, like the ones we 
just mentioned, have a social dimension. Others have a more private dimension, such as 
'my last bike drop'. As these examples show, some events are intentional, others not. We 
 argued in Kassel (2018) that the actions we plan and realize (for some of them) are an 
important class of events. Among these are individual actions (e.g., 'my writing of this 
essay') and collective actions (e.g., 'the FOIS 2018 conference'). 
Let us now turn to the intensional characterization of our events, and first of all the 
thesis (e_i) according to which events are abstract entities. 
The weaker thesis according to which certain events are mental constructs seems 
evident to defend. The argument is the importance of distinguishing between existence 
and occurrence (or realization): a football game, no more than a conference, can not be 
improvised; these events must be socially planned so as to be realized. The stronger thesis 
that no event is concrete is more difficult to justify and, failing to identify a decisive 
argument, we go forward two reasons: (1) failure to find examples that would not be 
covered by our current primitives, and according to a principle of economy, it does not 
seem opportune to open our inventory further, especially since (2) it should be noted that 
our category of 'brute fact' already makes it possible to account for the dynamics of the 
world with facts as those of process enaction by objects and process perpetuation (cf 
§3.2). 
Let us continue our characterization of events by referring to a property that usually 
qualifies them as ‘occurrents’, namely the fact that they may ‘happen’ (e_ii). Intuitively, 
to say that an event 'occurs', or is 'in progress', means that something happens which 
consists in the realization of the event. The occurrence of a football match consists of the 
play of two teams on a field, under the control of a referee. More formally, the definition 
that we retain of this property is as follows: 
Let e be an existing event for the subject s at time t; the event ‘occurs’ at a time t’ 
iff the facts of which history is related exist at time t’. 
The occurrence property of events may be considered analogous to the truth 
property of propositions [22]: the existence of facts conditions the occurrence of the 
event, as it conditions the truth of a proposition. We propose to use the term 
'occurentmaker' by analogy with 'truthmaker’'. A person's displacement event occurs 
when a series of ‘occurrentmaker’ facts exist corresponding to different and successive 
locations for the person. The order relationship between t and t’ in the definition 
determines whether the history is past, present, or future (we develop these points in 
Section 4). 
Let's come to evoke the way for events to bear properties. As Guarino has recently 
reminded us, the current point of view is that events carry their properties timelessly (for 
some authors, this characteristic distinguishes even the processes from events) [19]: 
“According to the standard wisdom, all temporal occurrences are considered as « frozen 
in time ». This means that all their properties are fully determined, and they can’t 
change.” Yet, as he also notes [19]: “This is certainly true for historical occurrences, but, 
at least in the ordinary language, ongoing and future occurrences seem to admit the 
possibility of change: the score of an ongoing match may change in time, and a future 
trip may be delayed.”  Our position, with the properties (e_iii) and (e_iv), is to consider 
that the properties of events are tensed, giving all events the possibility to change. A 
justification will be given in Section 4, we provide here the general idea. These properties 
are conceptual properties and their attribution to events at given times corresponds to 
judgments. Where judgments relate to past events, these judgments are well established 
and are unlikely to change (unless new historical elements lead us to review our 
judgments). Descriptions of past events therefore do not depend on time. On the other 
hand, and we join Guarino on this point, for current (and even future) events, things are 
 going differently. The reason is that judgments made about an ongoing event may depend 
temporarily on how the event is performed: a boring football match at a moment t 
(because the teams are watching at the beginning of the match) can become exciting at a 
later time t’ (when the teams are released from the stress of the beginning of the match 
and the match is "started"). 
 
In summary of this Section 3, and before going into the issues of existence and 
persistence of processes and events, Fig. 2 summarizes the progress made since the 
Galton (2008) experiential-historical distinction that has served us starting point. Our 
ontological framework consecrates a physical world populated by enduring substances, 
(static) objects and (dynamic) processes, whose instantaneous life consists of facts that 
obtain at instants 6 . World history, for its part, consists of psychological and social 
constructs accounting for changes (as well as stabilities) of the world over time. 
 
Figure 2. Overview of our ontological framework 
4. Processes and events’ modes of existence and persistence 
In this section, we specify the modes of existence of physical processes and events and 
this leads us to specify (revisit) the notions of endurance and perdurance. Before turning 
our attention to these entities in particular, an observation is needed concerning our 
ontological framework - it places on the same foot concrete and abstract entities - and 
this questions us on the type of ontology to be adopted: extensional, intensional or 
mixed? In preamble, in §4.1, we argue in favor of an intensional ontology, which leads 
us to specify the notion of endurance applied to physical objects. 
                                                          
6 This vision is to contrast with that proposed more recently by Galton [15]. A point 
of divergence, corresponding to the debate we were discussing in the introduction, 
concerns the nature of the processes that Galton considers to be extended entities (p.167) 
"(...) processes, being inherently temporally extended, can only exist over intervals, not 
at instants". The question concerns more precisely the ontology of time, of which Galton 
gives us different facets in [15]. We will content ourselves with saying here that, 
according to our conception of instants, they are certainly indivisible entities, but which 
nevertheless have a duration. What to relativize, in our eyes, the point of divergence. 
 4.1. Logical existence, physical presence and endurance 
As a starting point, let us return to physical objects, which constitute the paradigmatic 
figure of continuants. These objects are said to “wholly exist at any time of their 
existence” (an expression used by Stout to characterize physical processes). First, we 
adopt Fine's [11] analysis of this expression. A merit for us from his analysis is that it is 
abstract from any merological discussion (this will prove important for our 
characterization of process endurance). 
According to Fine [11], the meaning of the expression “o is wholly present”, in the 
case where o holds for a 3-dimensional physical object, is based on two notions that are 
to be distinguished: the fact of existing and, by this fact, that of occupying a spatial region. 
Still according to Fine, the existence of an object is not a matter of degree (an object 
exists or not), while its spatial extension can conceptually admit degrees: one can thus 
consider that o wholly occupies the spatial region in which it is extended, while 
occupying only partially parts of this region. The expression “o is wholly present” is 
therefore to be understood in the sense of 'o exists and o is fully extended spatially'. If 
we leave aside, for the moment, the notion of spatial extension, it remains to specify that 
of existence. 
In the literature, several notions of existence are evoked, in any case several terms 
are used: 'logical existence', 'ontological existence', 'physical presence'. In DOLCE (we 
take as reference the core DOLCE-CORE revisited by Borgo and Masolo [3]), the logical 
existence is granted to temporal entities. In addition to physical objects, the domain of 
discourse includes abstract entities such as regions of magnitudes of qualities or concepts 
(these abstract entities are considered to be able to enjoy a life by being created, modified 
and abandoned). Among the discourses made about the entities are those relating to their 
period of life, for example "Paul lived from 1925 to 2008" (time is also part of the 
discourse domain). This presence is represented by means of the predicate PRE(x,t) used 
to identify at what times t the entity x is present. This predicate makes it possible to 
express that Paul was present neither in 1920 nor in 2015, but that he was present on 
dates between 1925 and 2008. The presence of an object at different times – e.g.: 
PRE(Paul,T1)  PRE(Paul, T2), T1 and T2 being between 1925 and 2003 - reflects its 
endurance over this period. In the case of a general formula F(x, t), Borgo and Masolo 
refer to the meaning proposed by Trenton Merricks [29]: “x exists at t and it has the 
property F when t is (was, will be) present”. Since the subexpression “x exists at t” is 
synonymous with “x is present at t”, the following axiom is assumed: F(x, t)  PRE(x, 
t). 
These ontological commitments raise several problems. One problem, highlighted 
by Guarino [19], is that we cannot assign properties to x at times t where these x are not 
present. According to Guarino [19], this possibility is necessary for events “For instance, 
if x is an event that occurs at t0 (say, a person’s birthday), it may be expected at a time t1 
< t0 only if x is not present at t1, and remembered at a time t2 > t0 only if x is not present 
at t2, since we can’t expect nor remember something that is present”. It is as much for 
physical objects [19] “Similarly, a person can have various properties, such as being 
admired or being the mother of somebody, also when she is not present anymore since 
she is died”. A more general problem that we raise, related to the previous one, concerns 
the absence of distinction between logical existence and ontological existence (taken in 
the sense of physical presence). This distinction is critical for our ontology of events, 
identified with abstract objects. DOLCE-CORE's strategy is to admit abstract objects 
into the domain of discourse. They therefore enjoy a logical existence and, as such, 
 belong to the domain of the predicate PRE(x, t). The problem is that this predicate, whose 
role is to locate entities in time, turns out to be of no use (has no meaning) for events. 
For events, we need to express a notion of occurrence that is different from a location in 
time (see §4.3). For physical objects, we affirm that this distinction is equally important 
(to solve the problem raised by Guarino), but on the condition of interpreting the 
predicate PRE(x, t) as a physical presence/existence. 
To meet these needs, the proposal we make consists, first of all, in considering that 
our domain of discourse is populated only by objects of thought7. In the domain of 
semantics, this amounts to adopting a cognitive semantics [17] deemed to be able to 
speak of entities that “do not exist”8. On an ontological level, for physical objects, this 
leads to distinguishing the object of thought PaulOoT and its physical correlate PaulPO, 
namely the physical thing to which the object of thought refers. On the contrary, events 
are objects of thought that have no physical correlate. To characterize this difference, in 
a second step, we modify the semantics of the predicate PRE(x, t). The new predicate 
PRE'(x, t) that we propose has for domain objects of thought referring to physical things, 
and for significance: “the physical correlate of x is present at time t”. In this way, the 
physical endurance of a physical object is represented by the fact that its correlate is 
present at different times, for example: PRE'(PaulOoT, T1)  PRE'(PaulOoT, T2). 
Let's complete our theory of physical endurance. As stated in Section 3, we admit 
that the same object (to understand, the same physical thing) O can be F to t and not F 
to t'. This conception exposes us to the famous objection (formulated notably by David 
Lewis [25]) concerning the impossibility for a physical object to endure (in short, if O is 
F at t and not F at t', discernability implies that the O cannot be identical). We will content 
ourselves with noting that Lewis's argumentation calls for a merology of the object 
conceived as a 4-D entity. On the contrary, as indicated above, we follow Fine's 
conception by defending a 3-D theory of the physical object. For our conception of the 
physical identity of the object, we rather choose to base ourselves on a notion of essence 
of the object (by identifying the essence E of an object x with a property satisfying both 
conditions (1) it is not possible for x to be present without x being not E, and (2) E is 
unique to x so that there is no distinct y of x that bears E). In fact, to say that the same 
object endures amounts to saying that the same essence is present at different times. 
Changes in the object therefore only concern its contingent properties. 
4.2. Physical processes endure 
Let's come to characterize how physical processes exist and persist. We have seen in 
Section 3 the role we attribute to the process in the conceptualization of change. Precisely, 
a process is a concrete particular at the origin of the evolution of a physical object, this 
evolution corresponding to a series of facts, which series can be observed and 
conceptualized as a change. To repeat Stout's thesis, and illustrating it on a change of 
                                                          
7 In Section 2 we indicated that we intended to develop a descriptive ontology, in Strawson's sense. The 
choice we make here to opt for an intensional ontology goes in this direction. It will be noted that historically, 
and for reasons similar to those we have just stated in the preceding paragraph, such choices were made by 
Castañeda [4] (with his ‘epistemological’ ontology) and by Chisholm [6] (with his 'intentional' ontology). Our 
objects of thought can be compared with the individuals of Castañeda but also abstract individuals of Edward 
Zalta [43]. 
8 Discourses can relate to the house of Paul whereas this one does not exist yet (eg, "the house that Paul 
will make construct will comprise a broad terrace") or while it no longer exists (eg, " there is nothing left of 
Paul's house but a brick wall threatening to fall"). 
 location of an object, when a person moves while walking, a walking process is “wholly 
present” at any moment during the displacement, provided that the latter is uninterrupted. 
This 'whole' presence is to be compared with that of physical objects at any moment 
of their existence. As with objects, we adopt Fine’s strategy to distinguish between 
physical existence and the resulting temporal occupation. Regarding the physical 
existence, for which we retain an identity based on an essence, to differentiate the object 
of the process, we propose to distinguish, on the side of objects, a 'static' presence and, 
on the side of processes, a 'dynamic' one. To represent this dynamic presence, by 
borrowing a current terminology, we introduce the predicate OPE(x,t) meaning that “x 
operates (or is active) at time t”. The endurance of processes is therefore rendered by the 
fact that a 'same' process (in the sense of an essence) operates at different times, for 
example for a walking process WLK1: OPE(WLK1,T1)  OPE (WLK1,T2) (WLK1, T1 and 
T2 being objects of thought referring to physical entities). 
According to our characterization of processes, every operating process is enacted 
by an object concomitantly statically present, which constitutes a dependence of physical 
existence. In his theory of the endurance of physical objects, Peter Simons [33] has 
proposed, conversely, that all objects depend on processes. According to Simons [33]: 
“for a human being or other animal the relevant processes are those which are vital to 
it, which are a (probably not exactly delimited) collection of occurrents in its life, 
involving respiration, blood transport, nutrient breakdown and the chemical reactions 
within the cells. These are all processes which have to go in order for an animal to 
continue to exist”. In the case of inert objects like a stone [33]: “The widespread cohesion 
of the crystals in the rock which hold it together as a mechanically unified mass depend 
on chemical bonds among atoms”.9 According to this conception, processes and objects 
are mutually dependent for their physical existence. We hold this mutual dependence as 
a sign of the same notion of presence that specializes in static and dynamic. Recall that 
this concept of presence, on which we base our theory of endurance for the physical 
objects and processes, abstracts from any mereological analysis for these entities. 
4.3. Events logically endure and contingently occur 
Let's come to events. Since our conception of events is not classical, by not following 
the dominant (Davidsonian) thesis of concrete spatio-temporal individuals, we must 
expect that our characterization of their modes of existence and persistence will no more 
be so. Precisely, as we started to see in §3.3, we propose that events exist and persist 
logically. On the other hand, as regards the link with the physical world (of which they 
tell the story), where, for the objects and processes, we have retained a physical presence, 
for the events we retain an occurrence corresponding to a notion of physical realization 
by facts. 
As objects of thought, events enjoy a logical existence and identity. They exist at 
times for subjects but this time is distinct from the times of physical presence of the 
                                                          
9 A close analysis has also been proposed by Galton and Mizoguchi [16]: “Although a simple rock may 
seem intert and lifeless, in fact it exhibits some remarkable behaviour. If you live it alone, it twill just sit there 
– but significantly, it stays in one piece. The maintenance of the rock’s integrity is a process: from the point of 
view of the rock, it is an internal process enacted by the constituent grains of the rock (…) whose mutual 
cohesion holds the rock together”.  
 objects and processes of which they relate the history.10 In fact, compared to the time 
they are thought of, events can be spent, in progress or future. Their identity is 
determined and maintained by stipulation by subjects (individual or collective).11 We can 
talk about endurance about them. Thus the community of philosophers of action has 
become accustomed to perpetuate the event of Brutus' stabbing of Caesar. Here is an 
example of an event whose longevity is exceptional. The events corresponding to actions 
that we carry out daily (e.g., the fact that 'Paul has buttered a toast this morning') have a 
shorter life span. The endurance of events causes them to change by carrying properties 
that are contrary at different times: an event expected at a time t may no longer be at a 
time t’ (especially if it has occurred in the meantime). 
One theory usually advanced to account for the persistence of events is perdurantism. 
The reader will have understood that the logical persistence of which we have just spoken, 
which takes no account of a mereology of events, is foreign to the fact, for an entity, to 
exist only by its temporal parts and to persist in accumulating parties, which is the 
foundation of perdurantism. On the other hand, perdurantism has a relevant intuition that 
we wish to preserve, namely that an ongoing event “exists only partially”. The idea is 
that when an event is in progress (for example a football match has started), at any 
moment that the event lasts only a 'part' of the event 'exists'; past parts of the event no 
longer ‘exist’; other parts are coming and do not ‘exist’ yet. This intuition seems to us 
important to preserve, however we attach it to our notion of occurrence. The 
interpretation we give of an ongoing event is that the event "is realized, but only in part". 
The notion of a part of an event must therefore be elucidated. 
First of all, to say that an event is ongoing at a time t is to say that facts exist realizing 
the event. In §3.3, we qualified these facts as 'occurrentmakers', by analogy with the term 
'thruthmaker'. Let's take our example of football game. At the moment the event is in 
progress, it exists socially for both the players and the spectators. It existed long before 
the referee whistled the start of the match, to the point that the players were prepared and 
that the spectators were organized to attend. Its occurrence corresponds to the game of 
teams on the field, the fact that many processes operate generating occurrentmakers facts. 
To the question "what facts realize an event?” it will be noted that the same event can be 
accommodated in its realization of very different facts. Thus, for our example of match, 
according to the hazards of the game, the facts realizing it will be varied. In some cases, 
a balanced score at the ‘normal’ end of matches may result in an extension. More 
fundamentally, we will note that, an event being a social entity, its definition necessarily 
includes social uncertainty: in particular, does a football match start strictly with the 
teams' play or when spectators enter the stadium? In this sense, we can affirm with 
Achille Varzi that an event is a largely indeterminate entity [41]. 
In addition, a 'partially' realized event is an event of which only a 'part' is realized. 
The notion of part, in the case of physical objects, is based on a notion of spatial 
inclusion: a part of an object occupies a spatial region included in that occupied by the 
global object. In the case of events, the notion of inclusion can be retained, however the 
temporal dimension must be taken into account and it must be considered that the spatio-
temporal region concerned is that occupied by facts: part of an event is such that the facts 
                                                          
10 Events may also involve fictional objects such as those corresponding to Sherlock Holmes' reported 
exploits. 
11 In this text, for reasons of space, we elude the distinction between psychological identity and social 
identity. The reader may consider that social identity is constructed from psychological identities according to 
a mechanism of collective recognition as described by Searle [31]. 
 realizing it occupy a spatio-temporal region included in that occupied by the facts 
realizing the global event. An example of parts of events corresponds to slices of life of 
substances on interlocking periods: the childhood and adolescence of a person are part 
of his life. Another example of parts is given by intentionally realized events (actions) 
for which a plan, that is a structure in sub-events, is specified. A football match is thus a 
conventionally structured event: two periods of play succeed one another, interspersed 
with a half-time; at half-time, we can say that the match is only "partially" realized. In 
general, to specify the criteria for the unity of events, we must expect to encounter the 
same difficulties as for physical objects. 
5. Conclusion    
In conclusion of his [19], Guarino launches the motto 'Let’s defrost events!' to defend 
the idea of considering ongoing and future events as first-class citizens. The conception 
of the events that we have just presented goes in this direction since, by assimilating them 
to abstract entities, we confer on all events (past, current, future) the same mode of 
existence. In this regard, it should be noted that this status of objects of thought that we 
attribute to them does not mean - as some philosophers argue - second-class citizens 
(Joseph Melia's [28] attempt to eliminate the events from his ontology is an example). 
The idea that human actions correspond to events (an idea only evoked in this text and 
defended in [24]) seems to us to be a sufficient argument. 
In conclusion of this chapter, and to express the general principles of our ontology 
of the entities 'occurrences', we will add two slogans to that of Guarino: (1) ‘Let’s 
substantiate physical processes!’, so as to grant them the same mode of endurance as 
physical objects, and (2) ‘Let’s abstract events!’, to give them the possibility to occur in 
addition to that of existing. 
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